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A 
year ago, I received an E-mail 
from a research scientist at a 
major pharmaceutical company. 
The scientist had read my articles 
on whistleblowers who had raised 
concerns about the undue inﬂ  uence 
of the pharmaceutical industry on 
American medicine  My industry source 
had information for me about drug 
company practices, but—out of fear 
of career ruin—would only talk on 
the condition that I would conceal the 
scientist’s identity. 
For the next year or so, I had 
repeated contacts with the scientist. As 
I listened to this researcher—and to 
the other medical whistleblowers that I 
continued to interview—it occurred to 
me that each whistleblower was like the 
proverbial blind man with a hand on 
the elephant. Each could describe one 
piece of the puzzle, but the full picture 
could only emerge by bringing these 
whistleblowers together. 
With an eye to focusing on the 
systemic problems that have allowed 
American medicine to be unduly 
inﬂ  uenced by industry, on May 
15, 2005, I brought together ﬁ  ve 
whistleblowers in Washington, D. C. I 
asked them each to tell their story and 
to suggest ways to restore objectivity to 
medicine and medical research.
The Whistleblowers
Four whistleblowers attended in 
person, and the anonymous industry 
scientist participated via speakerphone. 
The whistleblowers came from an 
extraordinary variety of different 
professional backgrounds.
David Graham. This Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) safety 
ofﬁ  cer raised concerns about the 
cardiovascular side effects of rofecoxib 
(Vioxx) and other Cox-2 inhibitors. 
He testiﬁ  ed at a United States Senate 
Finance Committee hearing on 
rofexocib, the FDA, and Merck [1,2]. 
Graham attended the roundtable in 
his own personal capacity and was not 
representing the FDA. 
Allen Jones. This investigator at the 
Pennsylvania Ofﬁ  ce of the Inspector 
General led an investigation into 
an off-the-books account, funded in 
part by drug companies, from which 
payments were made to state employees 
to develop a medication treatment 
algorithm. He ﬁ  led a civil rights lawsuit 
against the Pennsylvania Ofﬁ  ce of the 
Inspector General to protect his right 
to publicly discuss his ﬁ  ndings, and was 
later ﬁ  red from his job for talking to 
the press [3–6]. 
Stefan Kruszewski. This Harvard-
trained psychiatrist was hired by the 
Bureau of Program Integrity in the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare to oversee the state’s mental 
health and substance misuse programs. 
He ﬁ  led a law suit in a federal court 
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
charging that he was ﬁ  red after 
uncovering widespread abuse and 
fraud in the bureau [7,8]. 
Kathleen Slattery-Moschkau. 
This former drug representative 
left the pharmaceutical industry 
after witnessing marketing practices 
that she found disturbing. She 
wrote and directed the movie Side 
Effects, a ﬁ  ctionalized account of her 
experiences [9,10].
The anonymous research scientist. 
This is an industry insider who said to 
me, ahead of the roundtable, that the 
culture of secrecy at drug companies 
too often results in claims that are 
closer to “propaganda” than science.
Lessons Learned from 
the Roundtable
Ties between drug regulators and 
industry may inﬂ  uence new drug 
approval. David Graham described the 
frustrations he had felt in his almost 
20 years of experience as an FDA 
drug safety ofﬁ  cer. Although he was 
instrumental, he said, in getting ten 
drugs off the market because of safety 
concerns, his experience was like a 
salmon swimming upstream—“a single 
individual…against the tide.” The tide, 
he said, “is an entire institution whose 
mission is to approve drugs and make 
industry happy.” 
The FDA, said Graham, is in a 
“collaborative relationship” with 
industry. The FDA gets money 
from drug companies through the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 
1992 (see http:⁄⁄www.fda.gov/cber/
pdufa.htm) “to approve new drugs 
and approve them more quickly.” The 
mindset at the FDA, he said, is that “we 
will ﬁ  nd a reason to approve a drug 
no matter how small the indication for 
the drug.” Graham explained that a 
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senior ofﬁ  cial at the FDA had told him: 
“industry is our client.” 
When the FDA knows there is a 
serious problem with a new drug, he 
said, the FDA deals with this by saying, 
“well, we’ll handle it in labeling” even 
though, said Graham, “FDA knows 
labeling doesn’t work.” 
“There is no independent voice 
for drug safety in the United States,” 
he said. The upper-level managers 
in the FDA’s Ofﬁ  ce of Drug Safety 
are appointed from the FDA’s Ofﬁ  ce 
of New Drugs, which approves new 
medicines. This makes the Ofﬁ  ce of 
Drug Safety “captive,” he said, to the 
Ofﬁ  ce of New Drugs. 
The anonymous scientist said that 
in order to speed up drug approval, 
companies “don’t measure things 
like whether we are really curing 
the disease, or prolonging life, or 
preventing hospitalization, or whether 
a patient is truly more functional. 
Oftentimes, we’re measuring 
intermediate, lesser things, markers, 
predictors—we hope—of these clinical 
endpoints, but they may or may not be 
accurate.”
And the FDA, said the scientist, 
requires just two positive studies to grant 
approval to a new drug, but there is no 
limitation on how many negative studies 
can be done before one or two positive 
studies are produced. This can lead 
to approval of a drug even when most 
studies are negative or show no effect.  
Both Graham and the anonymous 
scientist suggested putting an end 
to  the Prescription Drug User Fee 
Act, and Graham argued that there 
needs to be independent authority for 
those in charge of drug safety. They 
indicated that two bills in Congress, 
introduced by Senator Grassley and by 
Congressman Hinchey, at least partly 
address these concerns. 
“The pharma–FDA complex has to 
be dismantled,” said Graham, “and the 
American people have to insist on that, 
otherwise we’re going to have disasters 
like Vioxx that happen in the future.” 
The race to approve new drugs 
without proper safety testing may be 
compromising the public’s health. 
“Drug companies assiduously avoid 
acquiring information about side 
effects,” said the industry scientist. 
“Drug companies will not conduct 
safety studies unless they have to—
meaning basically that they’re required 
by a regulator—and that rarely 
happens.” High-risk patients who might 
have a bad reaction to a drug, said the 
scientist, “are excluded from studies 
deliberately, even though, when the 
drug is approved, these patients will be 
targeted for sales.” When a safety study 
is proposed within the industry, said 
the scientist, “a typical response will be 
that if we conducted a study to ﬁ  nd out 
if there was a safety problem, people 
would learn about it and think we 
had a problem [which] would destroy 
the image of safety that has been so 
carefully constructed.” 
Studies are too small and are 
conducted over too brief a period to 
properly assess safety: “The largest 
studies—the phase three studies, 
[which] might be several thousand 
people—last for a few months. If 
drugs kill one in several thousand per 
year, this would be a public health 
catastrophe. A blockbuster drug with 
that kind of hazard associated with 
it could be associated with tens of 
thousands of deaths a year, and it 
would never be detected in studies 
of the kind that we routinely submit 
and are the basis for approval.” These 
drugs, said the scientist, and these 
kinds of risks, are “essentially out there 
now, unlabeled, unnoticed, all beneath 
the radar.” 
The scientist said that, “to ensure 
that safety problems will go unnoticed, 
we compound the problem of 
conducting small studies by setting a 
statistical threshold for acknowledging 
the safety problem that is so high that 
you know in advance it could never be 
reached for any serious side effect, like 
myocardial infarction.” This practice, 
said the scientist, “virtually ensures that 
if a bad side effect happens to show 
up, it’s not going to reach the arbitrary 
level that we call statistically signiﬁ  cant, 
and the company can maintain that 
it’s just bad luck.” And if a bad result 
does happen, “typically a company is 
not going to publish the study at all. If 
they do publish it, the bad result can be 
omitted as ‘not statistically important.’”
The funding of state ofﬁ  cials by 
industry may be affecting prescribing 
patterns. Allen Jones described how 
he believed that drug companies were 
acting at the state level to inﬂ  uence the 
prescribing of psychiatric medications. 
“I began to investigate an account 
into which pharmaceutical companies 
were paying money that was being 
accessed by state employees,” he said. 
“Additionally, I found that various 
pharmaceutical companies were 
paying state employees directly—also 
giving them trips, perks, lavish 
meals, transportation, honorariums 
up to $2,000 for speaking in their 
ofﬁ  cial capacities at drug company 
events. They were given unrestricted 
educational grants that were deposited 
into an off-the-books account—
unregistered, unmonitored, literally 
operated out of a drawer.” 
These same state ofﬁ  cials, he said, 
were responsible for dictating clinical 
policy and writing guidelines for the 
treatment of patients in the state 
system. These ofﬁ  cials were, he said, 
receiving money from companies with 
a stake in the guidelines. “The protocol 
they [the ofﬁ  cials] were developing 
was called the Texas Medication 
Algorithm Project, TMAP, which began 
in Texas in the mid-90s. It outlined 
detailed medication guidelines for 
schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar 
disorder. It recommends almost 
exclusive usage of newer, patented, very 
expensive atypical antipsychotics, SSRIs 
[selective serotonin uptake inhibitors], 
and mood stabilizers.” The Texas 
Medication Algorithm Project, said 
Jones, was based on “expert consensus” 
from industry-supported meetings.
Jones said that when he wanted 
to investigate these ﬁ  ndings, he was 
shut down. “I was told point black, 
‘Look, drug companies write checks 
to politicians, they write checks to 
politicians on both sides of the aisle—
back off.’” He was told, he said, to “quit 
being a salmon, quit swimming against 
a stream.” He wouldn’t back down 
from his investigation, he said, and was 
demoted. On November 22, 2002, he 
ﬁ  led a civil rights lawsuit “to preserve 
my job and my right to speak out.” 
His employer, he said, took him off 
investigative duties altogether.
Stefan Kruszewski, who has ﬁ  led 
a law suit in a federal court in 
Pennsylvania, raised concerns to his 
seniors in the Pennsylvania Department 
of Public Welfare about prescribing 
practices in the state that he did not 
“There is no 
independent voice 
for drug safety in the 
United States.”
July 2005  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 7  |  e209PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0585
feel were evidence based, and said he 
lost his job for raising his concerns. 
For example, he alerted his seniors 
to the off-label prescribing of the 
anticonvulsant gabapentin (Neurontin) 
for mood disorders and addictive 
disorders. 
“The pharmaceutical industry is the 
single most powerful lobbying group 
on Capitol Hill—outspending even 
the oil and banking industries,” said 
Jones. “It should come as no surprise 
that the ties go far beyond just the 
mental health ofﬁ  cials who wrote the 
guidelines, but extend to many of the 
politicians who, in the end, allowed an 
investigation into pharma corruption 
to be dropped, and the investigator—
me—to be ﬁ  red.”
Efforts to detect and deter fraud and 
abuse due to these conﬂ  icts, he said, 
“will be likely to be undermined as long 
as those charged with detecting fraud 
and abuse, like the [Pennsylvania] 
Inspector General, are appointed by 
politicians who are themselves beholden 
to the drug industry. Such positions 
should instead be ﬁ  lled by career civil 
servants and not political appointees.” 
Regulatory agencies are not being 
held accountable. In comments that 
echoed his testimony to the US Senate 
Finance Committee, Graham said that, 
“FDA was the single greatest obstacle 
to doing anything effective with Vioxx. 
As a result, nearly 60,000 people 
probably died from that drug. That’s 
as many of our soldiers that were killed 
in the Vietnam war [who] died as a 
result of Vioxx use. And FDA had the 
opportunity, the responsibility, to stop 
that and didn’t. In fact, FDA allowed it 
to continue. In my book, FDA shares 
in the responsibility for those deaths 
and yet it’s not being held accountable 
by Congress.” Congress itself, added 
Graham, is deeply beholden to the 
drug industry since many politicians 
receive “often quite a bit of campaign 
contributions” from the industry.
Kruszewski reﬂ  ected upon the 
problems he said he had encountered 
in Pennsylvania, saying that “there is 
no accountability in the system for 
oversight [agencies].” He has become 
“a stronger advocate than ever for a 
federal patient bill of rights.”
Marketing departments can inﬂ  uence 
doctors’ prescribing habits. The 
research scientist said that the job 
was attractive because of the “many 
excellent drugs” developed, such as 
drugs to treat HIV, but the scientist 
“also saw drugs marketed in a way 
that will exaggerate the beneﬁ  ts and 
conceal the risks.” 
Kathleen Slattery-Moschkau gave 
an insider’s view of drug marketing 
practices, from her former experiences 
as a drug rep. She clutched her head 
in disbelief as she told the roundtable 
that doctors would come up to her with 
patients’ charts asking her for advice 
on treating patients. Slattery-Moschkau, 
like most of the drug representatives 
she came to know over the years, had 
no science background at all. 
The various techniques drug 
representatives were trained in to 
“educate doctors” eventually proved 
to be not just “comical” but “also 
scary,” she said. “Whether it was hiring, 
training, what we were told to say about 
drugs and what we were told not to 
say,” it was marketing, not science, that 
dominated. One of the techniques 
used by drug companies was to buy 
doctors’ prescribing records so drug 
representatives knew “to the dime” 
what drugs doctors were prescribing 
and could tailor their marketing to 
them. Drug representatives developed 
“personality proﬁ  les” on doctors 
and were taught to pitch their 
sales to speciﬁ  c personality types. 
Representatives were compensated, she 
said, by “how many prescriptions we 
could encourage.”
Both Slattery-Moschkau and the 
industry scientist described tensions 
within drug companies between 
marketing departments and industry 
scientists. “The marketing spin on 
things,” said the scientist, “carries the 
day.”
The published medical literature 
contains many biases. “When studies 
are published,” said the scientist, 
“they are frequently written not by the 
trained research scientist, who might 
have designed and analyzed the study, 
but by a designated medical writer with 
little if any background in research, 
but who is trained instead to craft 
the ﬁ  ndings of the study in the best 
possible way for the company.”
The body of literature available 
to the public, said the scientist, “is a 
biased sample of what companies want 
people to see.” The research scientist 
described “a culture of secrecy,” 
which makes it hard even for industry 
scientists tasked with ensuring drug 
safety to obtain the full datasets needed 
to genuinely understand a drug’s risk–
beneﬁ  t proﬁ  le. 
Conclusion
Whistleblowers have been compared 
to bees—they have just one sting to use 
and using it may lead to career suicide 
[11]. Many of the whistleblowers at the 
roundtable said they had experienced 
retaliation from their employers for 
raising concerns, but all had felt 
obligated to speak out about practices 
in medicine and medical research that 
they believe are risking the public’s 
health or safety. Graham said he felt 
“trapped by the truth” and had to act. 
“There are bigger issues here,” said 
Kruszewski. “I felt right from the start 
[that] if I wallowed in self-pity about 
being ﬁ  red and having my belongings 
piled in the gutter that I would never 
understand why all these things were 
happening. The bigger issue is that 
we’ve got people in the pharmaceutical 
industry and the health-care industry 
all acting in synchrony.” 
Each of these whistleblowers, in 
very different ways—from making 
a satiric ﬁ  lm to speaking out in 
Congress—has shone light on how this 
“synchrony” may be compromising 
the integrity of American medicine. 
We should not have to rely on medical 
whistleblowers to alert us to these fault 
lines. If we are to restore objectivity to 
drug development, prescribing, and 
safety monitoring, we must be willing 
to examine and change all of the 
institutions that allow this synchrony to 
occur.  
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